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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Carlos Adrian Cruz-Romero appeals from his judgment of conviction for felony 
driving under the influence, and argues that the district court erred by granting the 
State's motion in limine to exclude evidence that the lntoxilyzer used to test his breath-
alcohol content was not working properly. He asks that this Court vacate his judgment 
of conviction and guilty plea, reverse the order granting the State's motion in limine, and 
remand this case to the district court for further proceedings. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The Jerome County Police arrested Mr. Cruz-Romero on April 27, 2014, for 
driving under the influence. (R., pp.15-17.) The police gave him a breathalyzer test 
after they took him to the Jerome County Jail. (R., p.17.) He tested at .097 and .096. 
(Id.) The State later charged Mr. Cruz-Romero with felony DUI, I.C §§ 18-8004, 18-
8005(6), misdemeanor possession of an open container in a vehicle, I.C. § 23-505, 
driving without privileges, I.C. § 18-8001, and resisting and obstructing, I.C. § 18-705. 
(R., pp.65-67.) 
The State filed a motion in limine asking the court to prevent Mr. Cruz-Romero 
from presenting evidence that the lntoxilyzer had malfunctioned. (R., pp.144-46.) At a 
hearing on that motion, Deputy Sedlmayr, who is a breath test specialist, testified about 
the lntoxilyzer 5000 that was used to take Mr. Cruz-Romero's breath sample. (Tr., p.6, 
Ls.4-21.) Deputy Sedlmayr explained that he does calibration tests on the lntoxilyzer to 
ensure that it is working properly. (Tr., p.6, L.24 - p.7, L.8.) During those calibration 
tests, he uses two different solutions-a .08 solution and a .2 solution-and checks to 
1 
sure the lntoxilyzer reading is within the permissible range. , p.7, L.8 - p.8, 
11.) 
Deputy Sedlmayr also testified about specific calibration tests, as well as 
instances in which the lntoxilyzer was "out of tolerance," between April and August 
2014. The lntoxilyzer was out of tolerance on April 5. (Tr., p.19, Ls.11-19; see also 
Def. Ex. A, 1 p.1.) Deputy Sedlmayr did not know what was done about that problem, 
and it appears he was unable to explain what would normally be done about such a 
problem. (Tr., p.19, L.20 - p.20, L.10). The lntoxilyzer tested in tolerance during 
calibration tests on April 8 and May 9. (Tr., p.25, Ls.3-13; see also Def. Ex. A, pp.1, 3.) 
The lntoxilyzer was out of tolerance on May 15 and 16, but a calibration test later on 
May 16 showed it was in tolerance. (Tr., p.21, Ls.8-25; see also Def. Ex. A, p.4.) 
Deputy Sedlmayr could not explain what had happened on May 15 and 16. (Tr., p.22, 
Ls.1-3.) 
Deputy Sedlmayr also testified that on August 5, 2014, the lntoxilyzer was not 
calibrating properly for the .2 solution. (Tr., p.8, Ls.19-25; see also Def. Ex. A, p.7.) 
The lntoxilyzer was taken out of service on August 29, 2014. (Tr., p.9, L.5- p.10, L.12; 
see also Def. Ex. A, p.8.) After a series of tests, Deputy Sedlmayr and Rachel Cutler2 
from the Idaho State Police laboratory concluded that the lntoxilyzer was out of 
tolerance due to a problem with one of the jars used to perform a calibration test. 
1 The court admitted the lntoxilyzer's instrument operations log, for purposes of the 
hearing, as Defendant's Exhibit A at the 12/1/14 hearing on the State's motion in 
limine. That exhibit is found in the electronic document containing the non-confidential 
exhibits. The page numbers refer to the pages of the exhibit itself, not the electronic 
document. 
2 Ms. Cutler did not testify at the hearing on the State's motion in limine. 
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, p.8, L.25 - p.11, L. 13.) That jar may have been in use as early as March 2014, but 
Deputy Sedlmayr was unaware of any problems with it until August 5. 2014. (Tr., p.11, 
L.19 - p.12, L.7.) Deputy Sedlmayr said that, to the best of his knowledge, the 
lntoxilyzer was working properly on April 27, 2014 (Tr., p.14, L.25 - p.13, L.3.) He 
concluded as much because the April 8 and May 9 calibration tests were normal, and 
he knew of no other problems with the lntoxilyzer between those dates. (Tr., p.24, L.16 
- p.25, L 13.) 
During cross examination, defense counsel asked Deputy Sedlmayr a series of 
questions related to the problems and potential problems with the lntoxilyzer: 
Q: What are some of the things that can cause the machine to go 
out of tolerance? 
A: If it's not calibrating properly, if it's not within those ranges, it will 
say that it's out of tolerance, and it will stop the testing procedure. 
Q: And can those problems with the instrument affect the results of 
a blow? 
A: With how the lntoxilyzer 5000 is set up, due to the fact that it's 
out of tolerance, as I mentioned before, it won't allow the testing 
procedure to proceed. So if it goes-if it's not out of tolerance, then it is 
within proper evidentiary parameters. 
Q: What-can there be issues with the instrument where it doesn't show 
up that it's out of tolerance but there are still issues with the instrument? 
A: Not that I'm aware of. There's a lot of different checks and 
balances for-and information along those lines. I would have to refer you 
to Rachel Cutler from the ISP Forensic Lab. 
Q: So you don't have the knowledge to answer that? 
A: No. 
Q: And just to clarify your answer with regards to the testing jar, 
these out of tolerances that I have asked you about would have nothing to 
do with that jar-correct?-that we know of? 
A: I can't say whether it would be or not. If it was out of tolerance 
and I can't recall, I can't say. 
Q: Okay. And with regard to what Rachel Cutler did tell you, she 
indicated she couldn't find anything wrong; correct? 
A: Correct. 
Q: But that doesn't mean that there wasn't a leak?" 
A: Correct. 
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, p.22, L.4 - p.23, L.17.) 
Based on that testimony, the State argued: 
[T)he lntox machine was working properly on the date and time in 
question .... Any other time outside of that time frame, first off, would be 
misleading and irrelevant to a jury in the fact that there is nothing to show 
that on the day in question, the lntox machine instrument was not working 
properly. 
Unless the defense attorney can come up with an expert that says 
that the machine was, in fact, not working on that day, all the testimony 
that we heard today does show that it was working properly, checked 
properly, calibrated properly and, therefore, that those breath tests were 
accurate. 
(Tr., p.26, L.24 - p.27, L.12; see also Tr., p.31, L.17 - p.33, L.183.) Defense counsel 
countered: 
[A)ll of this information should be presented to the jury for them to 
determine whether or not this machine or instrument was working properly 
I believe there is evidence that a jury could determine that this 
instrument was not working properly; that between April and August we 
had issue after issue after issue until we finally pulled it out of commission. 
There is a fundamental difference between Rachel Cutler saying the 
machine is fine, and she can't find anything wrong with it and giving 
instruction on what should be done if there continues to be a problem. 
Your Honor, one thing that we did have from Deputy Sedlmayr is 
that if the .20 solution is out, it could have an effect on that .08 solution, 
and it could have-the test results could be higher. He did indicate he 
was not the expert on that particular set of circumstances and that would 
be for Rachel Cutler, Your Honor, but the burden of proof isn't on the 
defendant. The burden of proof is on the State to establish that this 
instrument was operating properly, and I don't believe a simple test on the 
day in question is sufficient to do that when the log surrounding that test 
indicates there's an issue with the machine to a point the [sic] we have to 
take it out in August. 
(Tr., p.28, L.16 - p.29, L.22.) 
3 The State appeared to argue that, even if relevant, the evidence should be excluded 
because it is misleading. See I.R.E. 403. Although the district court never decided that 
issue, Mr. Cruz-Romero contends that the evidence he wished to present is in no way 
misleading. 
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When asked what the probative value was of any evidence about the lntoxilyzer 
malfunctioning either before April 8 or after May 9, given that Mr. Cruz-Romero's breath 
test was taken on April 27, defense counsel responded: 
[JJust because it calibrated on those days does not mean this instrument 
was working during those dates ... It calibrated, and we have a test after it 
was out of tolerance, and we have no information as to why it was out of 
tolerance. . . 
And it is still probative value [sic] for this jury to understand that this 
instrument had issues during this time frame in and around those 
calibrations where it wasn't working properly, and it was out of tolerance. 
It's up to the jury to decide whether or not this instrument and the reading 
that it gave us is something that they believe establishes the BAC beyond 
a reasonable doubt 
(Tr., p.30, L.16-p.31, L.14.) 
Defense counsel further argued that, because the State would present evidence 
that the lntoxilyzer was working properly when Mr. Cruz-Romero gave his breath 
sample, he should be able to cross examine the State's witnesses about that 
conclusion (Tr., p.34, Ls.18-24, p.35, Ls.5-9.) Although Ms. Cutler would apparently 
only testify as a rebuttal witness if needed to counter a defense expert, defense counsel 
asserted that Mr. Cruz-Romero had a right to cross-examine Deputy Sedlmayr. 
(Tr., p.34, Ls.3-18, p.35, Ls.5-9.) 
The district court granted the State's motion: 
The Court is going to-as far as the evidence of the malfunctioning of the 
lntox 5000, the evidence before the court, at this time, demonstrates that 
between the certification of the machine on April 8th and the recertification 
on May 9th that it does appear, at least from the logs, that the machine 
was working properly at that time. There is no indication about a 
tolerance. 
Presumptively, the State's evidence will demonstrate the 
certification for the lntoxilyzer, the reliability of the test results. Absent 
expert testimony on the subject, the Court would find that any evidence of 
indications that the lntox 5000 was out of tolerance either before April 8th 
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of 2014 or after May 9th, 2014, is not of probative value. And certainly if 
the State does intend to call Ms. Cutler, then that certainly may change 
the analysis, but at this time, the Court does find that the test results 
before April 8th and after May 9th are not relevant and would not be 
admissible at trial. ... 
(Tr., p.35, L.10- p.36, L.6.) 
Mr. Cruz-Romero then entered into a conditional plea agreement. He pied guilty 
to felony DUI, and the State dismissed the remaining charges. (Tr., p.39, Ls.20-23, 
p.54, L.22 - p.56, L.19.) Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State would recommend 
that the court impose a ten-year sentence, with three years fixed; suspend the sentence 
and place Mr. Cruz-Romero on probation for five years; and suspend his license for five 
years. (Tr., p.39, Ls.4-5, p.39, L.23 - p.40, L.1.) The probation portion of the plea was 
binding on the court. (Tr., p.39, Ls.3-4.) Mr. Cruz-Romero also reserved the right to 
challenge the court's order granting the State's motion in limine. (Tr., p.40, Ls.3-7.) 
The court sentenced Mr. Cruz-Romero according to the plea agreement (R., pp.167-7 4; 
Tr., p.64, Ls.2-15), and he timely appealed (R., pp.187-89). 
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ISSUES 
Did the district court err by granting the State's motion in limine to exclude 
evidence of the lntoxilyzer malfunctioning? 
II Did the district court violate Mr. Cruz-Romero's constitutional right to present a 
complete defense by excluding evidence of the lntoxilyzer malfunctioning? 
7 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Granting The State's Motion In Limine To 
Exclude Evidence Of The lntoxilyzer Malfunctioning 
A Introduction 
The district court abused its discretion when it granted the State's motion in 
limine. The district court first found that the lntoxilyzer was working properly on the day 
in question, an issue that should have been left to the jury. From that conclusion, the 
court erroneously found that evidence showing that the lntoxilyzer was out of tolerance 
before April 8 and after May 9 was not relevant and would be excluded from trial. 
Finally, the court held that Mr. Cruz-Romero may be able to introduce that evidence to 
challenge Ms. Cutler's, but not Deputy Sedlmayr's, testimony. Those rulings were 
erroneous, and thus district court abused its discretion by granting the State's motion in 
limine. 
B. Standard Of Review 
This Court reviews the district court's decision to grant or deny a motion in limine 
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Richardson, 156 Idaho 524, 527 (2014). "A trial 
court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) recognizes the issue as one of discretion, (2) 
acts within the boundaries of its discretion and applies the applicable legal standards, 
and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason." Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Whether evidence is relevant is a matter of law which this Court 
reviews de novo. State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 348 P.3d 1, 54-55 (2015). 
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C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Granted The State's Motion In 
Limine To Exclude Evidence Of The lntoxilyzer Malfunctioning 
Relevant evidence, or "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence," I.R.E. 401, is generally admissible, 
l.R.E. 402; State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 596 (2007) (explaining that evidence that is 
relevant to a "material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged" is generally 
admissible). "[l]t is well established that a defendant may challenge a breathalyzer 
insofar as it measured the defendant's breath alcohol concentration, including whether 
the breathalyzer accurately measured his breath alcohol concentration, whether the 
particular device was working properly at the time of the breath test, and whether the 
breath test was properly administered " State v. Tomlinson, No. 41913, 2015 WL 
1529416, at *8 (Idaho Ct App. April 7, 2015) (surveying cases). 
The Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Ward, 135 Idaho 400 (Ct. App. 2001) 
is instructive. The Ward Court held that, after having determined that Ward's breath test 
was admissible at trial, the magistrate erred by prohibiting Ward "from attacking the 
accuracy, weight, or reliability to be afforded to the test results at trial." Id. at 405. The 
Court of Appeals explained that "[t]he burden of persuading the jury that the test results 
are accurate remains with the prosecution." and thus "'the reliability and performance of 
any given machine is subject to challenge."' Id. at 404 (quoting State v. 
Hartwig, 112 Idaho 370, 375 (Ct. App. 1987) (superseded by statute on other grounds 
as stated in State v. Howell, 122 Idaho 209, 212-13 (Ct. App. 1992)). "If there is 
evidence that any particular machine has malfunctioned or was designed or operated so 
as to produce unreliable results, such evidence would be relevant both to the 
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admissibility and the weight of the test results," Ward, 135 Idaho at 404 (quoting 
Hartwig, 112 Idaho at 375), Such evidence might include "concessions elicited on 
cross-examination of the officer who administered the test or testimony from a defense 
expert" Ward, 135 Idaho at 404, 
The Court of Appeals' decision in In re Hubbard, 152 Idaho 879 (Ct App, 2012), 
addressed this issue in the context of an administrative license suspension, Hubbard 
argued that "evidence of a wide fluctuation in performance verification readings 
immediately prior to and immediately after her September 6, 2010, [breath] test" 
indicated that the breath-testing machine was malfunctioning Id at 882, The district 
court, however, held that the performance verification result on the day of Hubbard's 
breath test established, as a matter of law, that the machine was working correctly, Id 
at 883, The Court of Appeals did "not agree with that analysis": 
Compliance with the ISP's standards for operation of the instrument is not 
a guarantee that it was operating correctly, Inadequate or incomplete 
operating standards and procedures could fail to disclose when a testing 
instrument is not functioning correctly, In , , , [Hartwig,] we held that 
although breath test results were properly admitted into evidence at a 
criminal trial because the State showed that the designated state agency 
had approved the machine for use and that the machine was operated in 
compliance with approved standards, the reliability and performance of the 
machine is still subject to challenge, We stated: "If there is evidence that 
any particular machine has malfunctioned or was designed or operated so 
as to produce unreliable results, such evidence would be relevant to both 
the admissibility and weight of the test results," 
Id (quoting Hartwig, 112 Idaho at 375) (internal citations omitted), 
Because Hubbard challenged her administrative license suspension, she had the 
burden to show the breath-testing machine had malfunctioned, The Court of Appeals 
concluded that she had not met that burden: 
10 
The only evidence of any irregularity or anomaly in the instrument's 
performance was the printout that indicated a performance verification 
reading of .042 for a solution with a known alcohol concentration of .083 
ten days before Hubbard's test. There was no testimony as to the 
significance or possible causes of this anomaly. For example, it cannot be 
discerned whether the .042 reading was the result of an actual, purposeful 
performance verification test, or some accidental or uncontrolled activation 
of the equipment. SOP 7.1.2 identifies a number of factors that could 
account for an aberrant verification result, including incorrect use of hoses, 
not having the instrument properly warmed, and incorrect blowing 
technique by the operator. The evidence here does not rule out any of 
these possible explanations for the .042 result on the instrument's printout. 
Hubbard, 152 Idaho at 883-84. 
As an initial matter, the court here abused its discretion by making a factual 
finding that should have been left to the jury. See Ward, 135 Idaho at 404-05 ('The 
burden of persuading the jury that the test results are accurate remains with the 
prosecution."); Hubbard, 152 Idaho at 883 (disapproving of the district court's 
conclusion that "the ISP's acceptable performance verification result on the day of 
Hubbard's test established that the machine was working correctly as a matter of law.") 
The district court found that the evidence in this case "demonstrates that between the 
certification of the machine on April 8th and the recertification on May 9th that it does 
appear, at least from the logs, that the machine was working properly at that time." 
(Tr., p.35, Ls.13-17 (emphasis added.) Based on its determination that the lntoxilyzer 
was working properly, the court found that the evidence regarding the malfunctioning 
lntoxilyzer was not "of probative value." (Tr., p.35, L.25.) The court's inquiry should 
have been limited to determining whether evidence about the lntoxilyzer malfunctioning 
between April and August was relevant to prove or disprove a disputed issue. 
See Ward, 135 Idaho at 404; Hubbard, 152 Idaho at 883; I.R.E 401, 402. The court 
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thus abused its discretion by finding that the lntoxilyzer was working properly between 
April 8 and May 9. 
Second, the court erred by finding that evidence of the lntoxilyzer malfunctioning 
was not relevant. See Ward, 135 Idaho at 404 ("'Obviously the reliability and 
performance of any given machine is subject to challenge."') (quoting Hartwig, 112 
Idaho at 375); Hubbard, 152 Idaho at 883 ("If there is evidence that any particular 
machine has malfunctioned or was designed or operated so as to produce unreliable 
results, such evidence would be relevant to both the admissibility and weight of the test 
results.") (quoting Hartwig, 112 Idaho at 375). The evidence presented at the motion in 
limine hearing showed that the evidence was relevant to a material and disputed issue 
in the case-whether Mr. Cruz-Romero's breath sample was accurate-and therefore 
whether he in fact committed the crime charged. See l.R.E. 401, 402. The lntoxilyzer 
used to test Mr. Cruz-Romero's breath on April 27 tested out of tolerance on April 5, 
May 15, and May 16 (Tr., p.19, Ls.11 9, p.21, Ls.8-25; Def. Ex. A, pp.1, 4); the 
lntoxilyzer did not calibrate properly on August 5, apparently because of a problem with 
a solution jar that was used as early as March 2014 (Tr., p.8, L.25 - p.12, L.7; Def. Ex. 
A, p.7); Deputy Sedlmayr could not say whether the malfunctions in April and May were 
related to that jar (Tr., p.23, Ls.4-10); and Deputy Sedlmayr could only infer that the 
lntoxilyzer was working properly on the day in question (Tr., p.14, L.25 - p.13, L.3, p.24, 
L.16-p.25, L.13.). 
Indeed, the evidence of the lntoxilyzer's malfunction in this case is much stronger 
than in Hubbard. In Hubbard, there was just one problem with the breath-testing 
machine ten days before Hubbard's breath test, and "[t]here was no testimony as to the 
12 
significance or possible causes of this anomaly." Hubbard, 152 Idaho at 883. In 
essence, the court did not know what significance, if any, that problem had on the 
validity of Hubbard's breath test, and it was Hubbard's burden to show the test result 
was unreliable. Id. at 883-4. Crucially, however, the burden of proof here is on the 
State. Given the evidence discussed above, the State did not and cannot meet its 
burden of showing that the lntoxilyzer was functioning properly-there were problems 
with the lntoxilyzer during the months surrounding Mr. Cruz-Romero's April 27 breath 
sample, and the State could not explain what caused all of those problems, whether 
they were remedied in any way, 4 or whether they may have affected Mr. Cruz-Romero's 
breath sample.5 The evidence relating to the lntoxilyzer's performance between April 
and August 2014 is thus relevant to determining whether Mr. Cruz-Romero's breath 
sample was accurate. The court erred by concluding otherwise. 
Finally, the court abused its discretion by holding that Mr. Cruz-Romero may 
have been able to introduce that evidence to cross-examine Ms. Cutler, but not Deputy 
Sedlmayr. The court did not provide its reasoning for differentiating between the two 
witnesses; it simply stated: 
4 Even though Deputy Sedlmayr provided an explanation for the problem in August 
(Tr., p.8, L.25 - p.11, L 13), Mr. Cruz-Romero contends that even that issue should be 
put to a jury. 
5 Again, Deputy Sedlmayr testified as follows: 
Q: What-can there be issues with the instrument where it doesn't 
show up that it's out of tolerance but there are still issues with the 
instrument? 
A: Not that I'm aware of. There's a lot of different checks and 
balances for-and information along those lines. I would have to refer you 
to Rachel Cutler from the ISP Forensic Lab. 
Q: So you don't have the knowledge to answer that? 
A: No. 
(Tr., p.22, L.18 - p.23, L.3.) 
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Presumptively, the State's evidence will demonstrate the 
certification for the lntoxilyzer, the reliability of the test results. Absent 
expert testimony on the subject, the Court would find that any evidence of 
indications that the lntox 5000 was out of tolerance either before April 8th 
of 2014 or after May 9th, 2014, is not of probative value. And certainly if 
the State does intend to call Ms. Cutler, then that certainly may change 
the analysis, but at this time, the Court does find that the test results 
before April 8th and after May 9th are not relevant and would not be 
admissible at trial. ... 
(Tr., p.35, L.10 - p.36, L.6.) 
Regardless of whether Ms. Culter or Deputy Sedlmayr testified about the breath 
test results, the State would rely on the results to prove its case and so Mr. Cruz-
Romero had a right to cross-examine the State's witnesses about their conclusions. 
See Ward, 135 Idaho at 404 ("[O]nce the trial court has made the threshold 
determination of admissibility [of the test result], a defendant is free to attack the 
reliability and accuracy of the admitted evidence through the presentation of evidence at 
trial. This evidence could include concessions elicited on cross-examination of the 
officer who administered the test or testimony from a defense expert.") (internal citation 
omitted). The district court abused its discretion by holding that the evidence might 
come in only if Ms. Cutler testified. The court should have denied the State's motion in 
limine. 
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II 
The District Court Violated Mr. Cruz-Romero's Constitutional Right To Present A 
Complete Defense By Excluding Evidence Of The lntoxilyzer Malfunctioning 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Cruz-Romero has a constitutional right to present a complete defense. That 
includes the right to introduce evidence and cross examine witnesses regarding the 
lntoxilyzer's performance in order to challenge the validity of his breath test results. By 
precluding Mr. Cruz-Romero from presenting such evidence, the court deprived 
Mr. Cruz-Romero of his right to present a complete defense. 
B. Standard Of Review 
This Court exercises "free review over the trial court's determination of whether 
due process standards have been satisfied " State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 788 
(Ct. App. 1999). 
C. The District Court Violated Mr. Cruz-Romero's Constitutional Right To Present A 
Complete Defense By Excluding Evidence Of The lntoxilyzer Malfunctioning 
"The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right 
to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations. The rights to confront 
and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in one's own behalf have long been 
recognized as essential to due process." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 
(1973); see also Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (the right to present a 
complete defense is protected by the Sixth Amendment); see also ID. CONST., art. I, § 
13. Although the right to cross examine may "bow to accommodate other legitimate 
interests in the criminal trial process . . its denial or significant diminution calls into 
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question the ultimate integrity of the fact-finding process and requires that the 
competing interest be closely examined " Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). If "the application of rules of evidence deprives a criminal 
defendant of a fair opportunity to defend against the charge, the conviction cannot 
stand." State v. Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing Chambers, 410 U.S. 
at 302-03 and Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1967)) (overruled on other 
grounds as recognized by State v. Galvan, 156 Idaho 379, 383 (Ct. App. 2014). 
The district court's erroneous exclusion of relevant evidence denied Mr. Cruz-
Romero his due process right to cross examine the witnesses against him. As argued 
by defense counsel: 
[W]hat the State's asking us to do is be precluded from cross examining 
their expert as to their conclusions. If the expert's allowed to testify based 
on whatever information they have that this machine is working properly, 
the defense has a right to question what they base that decision on. 
[Officer Stedlmayr] is considered an expert on the breath testing 
machine. He's going to testify that it was working properly. I, again, have 
a right to cross examine that opinion. 
(Tr., p.34, L.18 - p.35, L.9.) The State's case rested on the breath test results, and so 
Mr. Cruz-Romero had a right to challenge that result When the court erroneously 
precluded Mr. Cruz-Romero from calling the results into question, it deprived him of his 
constitutional right to defend against the State's accusations. See Chambers, 410 U.S. 
at 295; U.S. CONST., amend. VI; ID. CONST., art. I,§ 13. Because the court erroneously 
found the evidence to be irrelevant, this was not an instance in which that right merely 
bowed to other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. See Chambers, 410 
U.S. at 295. The district court therefore deprived Mr. Cruz-Romero of due process 
when it excluded the evidence of the lntoxilyzer malfunctioning. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Cruz-Romero respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of 
conviction and guilty plea, reverse the order granting the State's motion to suppress, 
and remand to the district court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 29th day of September, 2015. 
772 ~ J--? ,J Jd-,,,.._ 
MAYA P.ALDRON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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